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given to the Chinese authorities by the Hong Kong Police will be 
a less controversial subject than the matter of rendition of wanted 
persons: China is unlikely to make requests of the Hong Kong 
Police which threaten its own sovereignty or law and order and 
vice versa. How will China reassure Hong Kong citizens or place 
procedural safeguards in the way of the exercise of its own 
sovereign power?
In contrast with extradition to third countries, it is not to be 
expected that the sovereign power would permit its requests to 
its dependent jurisdiction to be challenged in Hong Kong courts 
on the basis of an overriding political motive. Would China also 
seek to avoid in any future arrangement to avoid the 'double 
criminality' requirement that has been for so long a safeguard in 
the field of extradition and which is expressly maintained in the 
Fugitive Offenders Ordinance? The safeguard tests the conduct 
complained of against the criminal law of the requested 
jurisdiction. This is the practical minimum that China should 
offer in any legal arrangements for the rendition of suspects, 
though such a safeguard may thereby offer the possibility that a 
Hong Kong court might need to examine the substantive
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criminal law of the People's Republic. Extradition also requires 
proof, normally in documentary form, of a prima facie case: this 
again could lead to a Hong Kong court examining the means of 
proof relied upon by the Chinese authorities, possibly exposing 
fundamental differences of approach in the ways in which 
evidence is gathered, what is regarded as evidence and how such 
matters are to be weighed by the courts.
Future arrangements for rendition and assistance would 
(presumably) operate alongside the long-established Hong Kong 
administrative practice of deporting those persons who enter 
illegally from China. Keeping this in mind, it should be possible, 
in typical instances of flight after violent crime or crimes of 
dishonesty, for the authorities to deal with the fugitive by 
deportation where the person has entered Hong Kong illegally. A 
similar approach, employing Hong Kong's Immigration Ordinance, 
might be adopted for a Chinese citizen suspected of offences in 
China who has overstayed in Hong Kong or whose right to
residence has been cut short by administrative means. Should 
such practices continue if and when China introduces a legal 
framework by which fugitives are rendered from Hong Kong?
Future rendition arrangements will be brought into critical 
focus should an incident arise whereby China requests the 
rendition of a Hong Kong permanent resident to face a serious 
criminal charge which may carry the possibility of the death 
penalty. Chinese penal provisions are harsh by western standards. 
The local business community will watch developments with 
concern. To imagine a further example, if a charge of fraud 
flowed from a joint venture, Hong Kong investment in ChineseJ ' o o
projects might be slowed. Joint ventures in China often involve 
state organs or are backed by politically powerful individuals.
CONCLUSION
Despite great progress, it has not yet been fully demonstrated 
that China maintains a clear line between the exercise of executive 
power and those matters which are expressed by its substantive law 
and constitution to be within the proper realm of legal remedy. It 
is for this reason above all that any purely administrative system of 
rendition or co-operation for mutual legal assistance would be 
suspect. Most local concerns would be met by a Hong Kong 
ordinance covering the subject of rendition and co-operation with 
China widi the same safeguards that are available to meet requests 
from or co-operation with third jurisdictions   but excluding the 
possibility of questioning the political motive of Chinese requests. 
The future under such arrangements would still present the 
judiciary in China and Hong Kong with great challenges, but 
challenges that can be met and from which both systems may 
emerge beneficially. Any course which avoids such challenges 
would demonstrate a lack of confidence by China's political 
leadership in both legal systems. @
David Fitzpatrick
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Glass-Steagall on life support
by Kimberley Anne McCoy
Spring   a time of rebirth and the renewal of hope. But for 
commercial bankers, those hopes are typically crushed, as Spring 
represents a time of annual Congressional angst over the future 
of the Glass-Steagall Act 12 USC. The Spring of 1997 was no 
different. While Congress debated whether the 64-year-old legal 
division between commercial and investment banking should 
continue, federal regulators presided over a dramatic end-run 
around the lawmakers. The board of governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, through an order effective from 6 March 1997, 
increased the revenue limits allowed for a s. 20 subsidiary of a 
bank holding company from 10% to 25%. Consequently, the past 
five months witnessed a flurry of acquisition activities as 
commercial banks took advantage of the new regulation.
The recent regulatory reform efforts go some way towards 
dissolving the barrier between commercial and investment
banking. But despite the success and global influence of the US 
banking industry, our banking laws remain anachronistic in 
comparison with other commercial centres. This article focuses 
on one of those antiquated laws, the Glass-Steagall Act. Although 
the regulators' reform efforts have been welcomed by 
commercial bankers, the Glass-Steagall Act will remain in its 
moribund state so long as Congress is unable to make the 
difficult legislative choices necessary to modernize our financial 
services system. The regulator-led piecemeal reform avoids the 
inevitable march of market and technological progress, ultimately 
impacting on the continuing vibrancy of our banking industry. 
This article will examine the Glass-Steagall Act, the regulatory 
efforts to respond to the banking industry's calls for reform and 
the economic price of maintaining the status quo. 29
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HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Over 60 years ago, the US was in the throes of a major 
economic catastrophe. The stock market crash of 1929, the 
widespread hanking panic of 1932 and 1933, leading to over 
1,500 hank failures and the ensuing Great Depression number as 
some of this country's darkest days. President Franklin D 
Roosevelt's administration and Congress responded to the 
financial crises by promulgating the Banking Act 1933, of which 
tour provisions constituted the Glass-Steagall Act.
Popular consensus in the early 1930s was that commercial 
banks' securities activities resulted in unsound stock market 
speculation, causing the failures of numerous banks and the 
Great Depression. The Glass-Steagall Act's legislative history 
indicates that Congress believed that the nexus between 
commercial and investment banking produced conflicts ot
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interest and jeopardized bank safety. In an attempt to insulate the 
banking system from the risks associated with securities activities, 
the Glass-Steagall Act partitioned commercial and investment 
banking functions by prohibiting national and state-chartered 
banks that were members of the Federal Reserve System from 
conducting investment banking activities and from being 
affiliated with investment banks. The most important provision 
for purposes of this article is s. 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act which 
proscribes affiliations between national and state member banks 
and firms:
'... engaged principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public 
sale, or distribution . . . of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other 
securities'
Three other provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act addressed 
Congressional concerns. Section 16 of the Act prohibits national 
and state member banks from underwriting, selling and dealing
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in securities. Section 21 complements s. 16 by forbidding 
investment banks from accepting deposits, an activity regarded as 
engaging in commercial banking. It should be noted that the 
prohibitions in s. 16 and s. 21 contained exceptions for 'bank 
eligible securities' (primarily government securities) in which 
national and state member banks could deal. Finally, s. 32 
prohibits officer, director or employee interlocks between 
national and state member banks and securities firms primarily 
engaged in underwriting and dealing.
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RECONSIDERATION NEEDED?
The prohibitions imposed by the Glass-Steagall Act should be 
re-considered for two reasons. First, since the Glass-Steagall 
Act's enactment in 1933, the American financial services 
landscape has changed dramatically. The complexity of financial 
regulation, the structure of American capital markets, 
technological progress and the tremendous growth of the 
economy all point to the appropriateness of re-examining the 
separation of commercial and investment banking.
Secondly, empirical evidence indicates that the assumptions 
used by the 1933 Congress in promulgating the Glass-Steagall Act 
were based on incorrect data. With the benefit of hindsight, 
economists are able to conclusively demonstrate that the link 
between commercial banks' securities activities and the stock 
market crash, bank panics and the Great Depression is tenuous. 
In A Monetary History of the US 1857-1960 (1963), Milton 
Friedman and Anna Schwartz argue that restrictive monetary 
policy and protectionist trade measures contributed to the 
numerous bank failures.
Other economists point to additional alternative explanations. 
For example, technological advances in communications and 
transportation in the 1920s rendered superfluous small banks 
located in remote areas. In addition, dismal agricultural output in 
the late 1920s led to a number of mostly small bank failures when 
credit defaults occurred. Finally, poor supervision of 
undercapitalized small banks, coupled with the changing 
economic climate, inevitably produced some bank failures as 
well. Thus, research indicates that, contrary to Congress' view at 
the time, commercial banks' securities activities were not 
responsible lor the economic malaise in the late 1920s and early 
1930s. In fact, the majority of commercial banks with securities 
affiliates survived the Great Depression.
The separation of commercial and investment banking 
activities was not challenged for 50 years. In the 1980s, however, 
the undeniable dynamics of a globalized financial system and the 
nearly unanimous concurrence among economists that the 
rationale underlying the separation was incorrect prompted 
commercial bankers to urge Congress and federal regulators to 
reform the law. Several Congressional attempts to reform the law 
followed, but ultimately it was the regulators who answered the 
commercial bankers' pleas. Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve, commented in 1987 that Glass-Steagall 
represented:
'... perhaps the single most important anomaly that now plagues our 
financial system'
The 1980s were a difficult decade for commercial bankers. In 
Banking Law and Regulation (1992), Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey 
Miller note that, in 1970, eight US banks occupied the list of the 
world's top 25 banks in terms of assets. By 1980, the number 
dropped by half and in 1990 only one US bank held on to a spot 
on the list. American banks' share of the financial services market 
diminished as consumers and businesses turned in greater 
numbers to the securities market as an alternative way to invest 
and to raise capital. It was in this environment that Citicorp 
petitioned the Federal Reserve in 1984 to allow one of its 
subsidiaries to engage in underwriting and dealing. Citicorp 
argued that 'engaged principally' (s. 20) was equivalent to a bank 
holding company's subsidiary earning revenues of 20% or less 
from bank-ineligible securities activities. The Federal Reserve 
responded negatively and Citicorp withdrew its application.
Regulators eventually became more receptive. In 1987, 
Bankers Trust petitioned the Federal Reserve to allow it to 
engage in private placements of commercial paper. Commercial 
bankers' lending profits dwindled in the 1980s as businesses 
turned to the commercial paper market for their short-term 
financing needs, rather than entering into traditional lending 
arrangement with commercial banks, and this phenomenon 
spurred Bankers Trust to file its application. The Federal Reserve 
determined that affiliates could engage in bank-ineligible 
securities activities such as the private placement of commercial 
paper, so long as the s. 20 subsidiary's revenues from such 
activities did not account for more than 5% of the bank holding 
company's revenues. Shortly thereafter, the Federal Reserve 
approved Citicorp, J P Morgan and Bankers Trust's applications 
to establish s. 20 subsidiaries to underwrite and to deal in 
commercial paper, municipal revenue bonds and mortgage- 
backed securities. Two years later, the Federal Reserve expanded 
the bank-ineligible securities activities to include corporate debt 
and equity underwriting and increased the revenue limit to 10%, 
an increment contemplated in the 1987 Citicorp order.
It should be noted that throughout this period of regulatory 
activity, a series of measures called 'firewalls' were imposed. The 
firewalls were intended to address bank safety and soundness 
issues, as well as potential conflicts of interest and risk 
management controls. The term 'firewall' derives /rom Adam 
Smith's Wealth of Nations, wherein he analogized the regulation of 
issuing bank notes to the construction of walls to prevent the 
spread of fire. In essence, then, the term connotes the prevention 
of financial risks that may spread within a banking entity.
INCREASED ROOM FOR GROWTH
After achieving a measure of regulatory relief in 1989, 
commercial bankers re-visited the revenue test with the Federal 
Reserve. Commercial bankers discovered that their eligible 
securities activities, such as underwriting and dealing in 
government securities, carried a shorter term than their newly
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obtained bank-ineligible securities activities so that when the yield 
curve steepened, the revenues derived from the bank-eligible 
securities activities declined relative to the revenues derived from 
bank-ineligible securities activities. Accordingly, commercial 
bankers petitioned the Federal Reserve for additional assistance. 
In 1993, the Federal Reserve adjusted its revenue test in order to 
take account of fluctuations in the level and structure of interest 
rates and permitted an adjustment by indexation to the 1989 
interest rate structure.
The Federal Reserve recognized that the new indexation 
method would entail significant compliance costs for the 
commercial banks, so it provided an option for banks to use the 
previous, non-indexed test. Two Federal Reserve governors 
disagreed with the optional structure and concluded that the 10% 
revenue limit should be increased to accommodate the banks' 
pushing against the revenue cap. The commercial bankers agreed 
and, in 1994, 30 banks suggested an increase in the revenue limit 
to 25%. Several Federal Reserve governors commented at the 
time that they would consider raising the revenue limit, but not 
until Congress had been given the opportunity to enact reform 
legislation.
Congressional efforts to pass legislation failed and in 1996 the 
regulators stepped into the breach. A series of dynamic steps were 
taken by federal regulators. First, the Federal Reserve announced 
in September 1996 that interest earned on debt securities 
qualified as eligible revenue. By this time, though, the Federal 
Reserve was not the only regulator willing to push reform efforts 
on behalf of the commercial banks. In November 1996, the 
Office of the Comptroller unveiled a new rule allowing national 
banks to conduct bank-ineligible securities activities without 
needing the bank holding company structure, a necessary 
component for s. 20 subsidiaries. Under the new rule, 
applications would be reviewed on a case-by-case basis by the 
Comptroller of the Currency and national banks could potentially 
engage in a variety of new activities, such as the establishment of
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insurance subsidiaries.
Despite the seemingly broad mandate, only two banks, Nations 
Bank and Zion's Bank, actually filed applications with the Office 
of the Comptroller. Following the Comptroller of the Currency's 
announcement, the Federal Reserve quickly acted upon its August 
1996 proposal and increased the revenue limit for a s. 20 
subsidiary's bank-ineligible securities activities from 10% to 25%. 
This was effective from 6 March 1997. During these months of 
heightened regulatory activity, the Federal Reserve also modified 
or eliminated some of the firewalls imposed in 1987 and 1989.
Commercial bankers responded immediately. On 7 April 
1997, Bankers Trust announced that it would acquire Alex 
Brown & Sons in a stock swap valued at $ 1.7 billion. Three other 
significant deals followed. In mid-May, Swiss Bank Corporation 
acquired Dillon Read for $600m and on 9 June, Bank America 
Corporation, the third largest commercial bank in the US, 
announced its plan to purchase Robertson, Stephens & Co for 
$5 40m. The most recent proposed acquisition was Nations Bank 
Corporation's $1.2 billion combined cash-stock offer for 
Montgomery Securities.
So far, only niche market investment banks have been gobbled 
up by the commercial banks. Alex Brown & Sons is one of the 
oldest and most respected investment banks but its franchise is 
primarily focused on the US equity market in a limited number 
of industries. Dillon Read, an investment bank with a blue-chip 
client list, was once one of the most powerful and influential Wall 
Street firms but today it remains primarily an advisory boutique. 
Robertson Stephens and Montgomery Securities are also 
regional, San Francisco-based investment banks that capitalized 
on the tremendous expansion of a selected number of industries, 
such as technology and healthcare, but have yet to achieve a 
national franchise or to expand beyond more than a handful of 
industries.
It is too early to determine if these acquisitions will return a 
healthy profit for the acquiring commercial banks. What is likely, 
though, is that other commercial banks will take advantage of 
their new growing room. The golden opportunity for any 
commercial bank is the acquisition of a bulge bracket investment 
bank, boasting an array of financial services both nationally and
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internationally. However several obstacles to a profitable union 
exist. For example, the marriage between a commercial bank and 
an investment bank would entail many difficult integration 
decisions, such as operational control and streamlining 
overlapping product areas. In addition, cultural clashes on issues 
such as compensation are likely. There are certain to be some 
profitable and some not-so-profitable unions. What is most 
significant, however, is that the gradual dissolution of artificial 
barriers between sectors of the financial system will result in the 
more efficient use of capital, decreased costs for consumers, 
diversification of risk for financial institutions and a shot in the 
arm for commercial banks competing against international banks 
for capital.
Commercial banks' prosperity depends on the retention of a 
comparative advantage over other entities in assembling capital 
and investing in profitable lines of business. Regulation, by 
design, closes some opportunities or increases the costs of 
finding a substitute opportunity. The commercial banks' 
comparative advantage is damaged and capital simply moves on 
in search of another intermediary.
STRUCTURE AT ODDS WITH MARKET
The banking regulatory structure in the US developed largely as 
a response to real or perceived crises or emerged as a result of a 
political compromise between competing sectors of the financial 
system. This inchoate approach translates into a banking regulatory 
structure at odds with economic theory and market practice. For 
example, modern portfolio theory conclusively demonstrates uSat 
diversification of investments is the best way to minimize risk. It is 
ironic, then, that the Glass-Steagall Act achieves the opposite of its 
purported objective, the promotion of bank safety and soundness. 
By restricting the types of investments and securities activities 31
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commercial banks may engage in, legislators actually increase 
commercial banks' risk rather than decrease it. Moreover, the 
absence of commercial bank competition in certain securities 
markets results in a greater concentration of entities in those areas, 
another antithetical result. Not only have the rationales behind the 
Glass-Steagall Act been contorted, but the fears of legislators in 1933 
have never been realized. Research indicates that the investment 
banking activities of US commercial banks doing business abroad
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have been conducted without significant loss. Moreover, in the ten 
years since commercial banks have been able to conduct a limited 
amount of bank-ineligible securities activities, no significant 
adverse consequences have occurred.
A variety of empirical studies conclude that a number of 
economic benefits are obtainable if the barrier between 
commercial banking and investment banking disappears. This 
article will not attempt to engage in an extensive analysis of the 
economic studies undertaken to date. Apart from the recognized 
economic benefits of the portfolio theory and the efficient capital 
markets theory, some of the more obvious benefits should, 
however, be mentioned. For example, natural synergies between 
commercial and investment banks, such as credit assessment, are 
capable of producing economic benefits. Credit evaluation is an 
important element of both traditional lending and underwriting 
securities, and loan syndication among commercial banks is 
functionally similar to an underwriting arrangement. A certain 
economy of scale can be reached if credit assessment information 
is secondarily utilized when a borrower wants to issue debt. In a 
broader context, the largest banks in the world are able to compete 
more effectively for capital since they are not precluded from 
consolidating commercial and investment banking activities. In 
essence, US commercial banks have been fighting for capital and 
growth with one hand tied behind their back.
Notwithstanding the economic advantages involved in
o o
dismantling the Glass-Steagall Act, those benefits must be weighed 
against possible disadvantages. One of the most frequent concerns 
voiced in the debates over the Glass-Steagall Act, then and now, is the 
potential for conflicts of interest. The Pecora hearings in the 1930s 
highlighted some of those conflicts, most notably the worry that a 
commercial bank, in its eagerness to promote the securities it 
underwrote, would eschew a balanced presentation of relevant 
facts and inadvertently (or advertently, if the commercial bank were 
less scrupulous) mislead its depositor-customers who might be 
persuaded to invest in such securities. As mentioned above, 
regulators designed firewalls to prevent these conflicts of interest. 
If, in fact, the established firewalls have prevented conflicts of 
interest, it is expected that no difference in the initial yields of 
similar s. 20 subsidiaries and investment bank underwritings
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should exist. In 'Repealing Glass-Steagall: The Past Points the Way 
to the Future' Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Review vol. 
37 (July/August 1996), Amar Gande, Manju Puri, Anthony 
Saunders and Ingo Walter, in a study undertaken in 1995, found 
no significant statistical differential in the yields of similar issues 
underwritten by four s. 20 subsidiaries and those underwritten by 
investment banks.
WHO BENEFITS FROM REFORM?
Another economic cost, infrequently noted in the journalistic 
accounts of the regulatory and legislative debate, but of 
potentially great significance, involves regulatory turf battles. 
Even if the Glass-Steagall Act is eventually abandoned, who will 
regulate what in the new structure? In his 'The Theory of
Economic Regulation' in the Bell Journal of Economic and 
Management Science (Spring 1971), Nobel Prize economist George 
Stigler argued that regulators do not always guard the public's 
interests, but rather serve the interests of the regulated. In 
essence, Stigler dieorized that suppliers, such as regulators and 
legislators, sell power over the wealth of a regulated industry. 
Various groups compete for access to die supplier's power and 
ultimately the more cohesive group wins. Stigler stated that the 
public typically lost these battles because of the perceived defused 
benefits, their weak incentives to collect information and the 
difficulties in organizing. The groups most directly affected by 
regulation, on the other hand, typically won because of their 
ability to organize and to bring pressure on the political process. 
Thus, consumers lose to the more organized and well-informed 
'producer' groups as a result of their informational and 
organizational disadvantages.
In the case of the recent regulatory developments discussed 
above, it is interesting to observe that Stigler's theory has 
application here as well. While it is certain that the Federal 
Reserve and the Office of the Comptroller are well-intentioned 
in their efforts to reform the banking regulatory structure and 
bank regulations appear to be lessening, the regulators are not 
presiding over a concomitant decrease in their numbers. Even 
before the Glass-Steagall Act is history, federal regulators are 
staking out their claims to new regulatory territory. The Federal 
Reserve advocates a system in which an 'umbrella' regulator 
would have authority over all aspects of the new consolidated 
businesses. The Office of the Comptroller and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, on the other hand, contend that 
functional regulation is the best approach, whereby each 
regulator will remain in charge of its traditional area of authority. 
Regardless of which regulatory view succeeds, the cost that 
consumers pay is high. Tax dollars feed large regulatory staffs 
while regulation ultimately increases the cost of financially- 
related services to the consumer. It would seem prudent to ask 
for a good, old-fashioned cost-benefit analysis of our banking 
regulations.
Only Congress can pull the plug on the Glass-Steagall Act. So far, 
though, Congress has been reluctant to do so, choosing instead 
to remain on the sidelines while regulators assumed 
responsibility for the most far-reaching reforms yet. The 
regulatory reforms promulgated by the Federal Reserve and the 
Office of the Comptroller are certainly welcome but they are not 
a panacea for the burdens imposed by the Glass-Steagall Act. The 
selective unwinding of particular restrictive Depression-era laws 
is not a substitute for the development of comprehensive 
structural reform of the banking industry. A modern regulatory 
structure is essential if the US is to continue its pre-eminent 
position in the global financial market. Our financial services 
system cries out for deliverance. @
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